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INTRODUCTION 
One of the questions for discussion today is whether public rights litiga-
tion is an effective means of social change.  This Article does not attempt 
an answer but begins to explore a set of issues central to any answer: the 
extent, types, uses, and potential shortcomings of government whistleblow-
ing.  There is considerable sociological and legal literature on government 
whistleblowing, but little of it addresses the issue from the angle relevant to 
maximizing the efficacy of public rights litigation.  This Article begins to 
fill that gap.  Part I discusses the importance of whistleblowers in the vin-
dication and enforcement of public rights.  Part II suggests eight traits that 
increase a government whistleblower’s utility to public rights litigators, 
such as access to information, insight, willingness to disclose, and relative 
honesty.  Part III proceeds on the assumption that the effectiveness of pub-
lic rights litigation depends in part on litigators’ use of the highest utility 
 
† Attributed to Greek philopher Diogenes of Sinope.  See THE COLUMBIA WORLD OF QUO-
TATIONS (Robert Andrew et al. eds., 1996) (“Discourse on virtue and they pass by in droves, 
whistle and dance the shimmy, and you’ve got an audience.”). 
∗ Catholic University, Columbus School of Law. 
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whistleblowers.  This Part also suggests several concrete issues one could 
explore empirically to assess litigators’ present use of such whistleblowers; 
the discussion concludes with a somewhat more in-depth examination of 
one such issue: the legal landscape confronting federal government whis-
tleblowers.  Part IV offers very preliminary empirical evidence that the 
predictions of Parts II and III accord with reality.  The Article concludes 
with a summary of outstanding questions about the importance of govern-
ment whistleblowing to effective public rights litigation, and an outline of a 
possible approach to investigating these questions. 
I.  THE CENTRALITY OF WHISTLEBLOWERS 
Some background is necessary to explain why I consider government 
whistleblowing essential to effective public rights litigation.  If today’s 
question were whether litigation seeking to vindicate a widely-shared right 
can effect social change, one would not need to look beyond Brown1 and 
Roe2 to reach an affirmative answer.  Clearly, even in the absence of whis-
tleblowers, public rights litigation is one means of changing social policy. 
For such litigation to serve as an effective tool to shift policy in a con-
certed direction, however, numerous predicate conditions must be met.  For 
instance, litigators hoping to achieve such a shift must identify appropriate 
test cases with sympathetic plaintiffs and facts,3 decide whom to sue, where 
to file suit, what causes of action to raise,4 meet the often stringent justicia-
 
 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that public schools cannot be 
segregated on the basis of race). 
 2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down Texas statutes prohibiting abor-
tions at any stage of pregnancy except to save the life of the mother). 
 3. See, e.g., Emily Zackin, Popular Constitutionalism’s Hard When You’re not Very 
Popular:  Why the ACLU Turned to Courts, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367, 375-76 (2008) 
(suggesting that the ACLU may have modeled its litigation strategy in part on organizations 
like the NAACP, which “almost from its inception in 1909 . . . used courts as one avenue to 
promote its political agenda[, establishing] a national legal committee to review relevant 
cases and recommend promising ones for the organization’s involvement” (citing Susan D. 
Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 97 (2002)). 
 4. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGRE-
GATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 1-33, 105-37 (1987) (describing the NAACP Legal De-
fense Fund’s litigation strategy in the decades leading up to Brown, and specifically noting 
the importance of local support for the litigation efforts); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, So-
cial Movements, and the Law:  The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 
1447 & n.38 (2005) (arguing that the Center for Individual Rights, a conservative public 
interest group with an “agenda of ending—categorically—affirmative action policies bene-
fiting racial minorities” has followed the LDF’s legal blueprint, making “deliberate choices 
about who will serve as plaintiffs in the test cases that it chooses to bring” (citing LEE EP-
STEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 94, 113, 120 (1994); GREG STOHR, A BLACK AND WHITE 
CASE:  HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SURVIVED ITS GREATEST LEGAL CHALLENGE 46-49 
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bility requirements of the chosen forum,5 and obtain and coordinate suit-
able amicus filings.6 
These litigation-related concerns do not become relevant, however, until 
public rights advocates have formulated a social change agenda and begun 
weighing action strategies and evaluating the utility of litigation.  Prior to 
that point, there is a different critical concern: access to information.  Liti-
gators cannot effectively drive social change unless they have complete and 
accurate information about the social ills they seek to correct. 
Take, for example, the problems facing state public defenders’ offices, 
many of which find themselves “pushed . . . to the breaking point” by 
“budget cuts and rising caseloads.”7  A recent study suggests that lawsuits 
filed over the last fifteen years have been fairly successful at “creat[ing] 
substantive, lasting reform” of indigent defense systems.8  These so-called 
 
(2004))); see also Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am., Perspective from the Bench:  How Civil 
Rights Issues Are Viewed by the Court—What Works and What Doesn’t, 1 ANN.2004 
ATLA-CLE 211, 214 (2004) (providing informal advice on “what needs to be done to im-
prove the chances for successfully litigating a civil rights case,” including considerations 
relevant to forum and claim selection). 
 5. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:  Deputizing Private 
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000).  Gilles argues 
that under recent, restrictive Supreme Court standing holdings, notably City of Los Angeles 
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983): 
[w]e have lost . . . the powerful force of the citizenry as a direct agent in effecting 
meaningful social change through America’s courts. Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, . . . Roe v. Wade, . . . and scores of other landmark constitutional cases were 
driven by private plaintiffs who sought not only redress for themselves, but pro-
tection for society at large against the harms that they had personally suffered. . . . 
None of the plaintiffs in these cases would have been able to scale the equitable 
standing bar erected in Lyons. 
Id. at 1386; see also, Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 434, 473, 475-76 (2007) (discussing the standing hurdles that private attorneys gen-
eral face in suits alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 6. See, e.g., Amy Leigh Campbell,  Raising the Bar:  Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the 
ACLU Women’s Rights Project, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 157, 224 (2002) (detailing the care-
ful strategy formulated by Justice Ginsburg—then Director of the ACLU Women’s Rights 
Project—for pursuing women’s rights through the courts, and noting that “a critical compo-
nent . . . was the coordination of amicus briefs for the cases on which she was the primary 
attorney”).  See generally Nicole J. De Sario, The Quality of Indigent Defense of the 40th 
Anniversary of Gideon:  The Hamilton County Experience, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 43, 61-62 
(2003) (noting the difficult questions of (1) whom to include as plaintiffs; (2) where to sue; 
and (3) whom to sue); Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 
33 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295003 (discussing the strategic choices necessary for “suc-
cessful systemic litigation” to reform inadequate indigent defense systems). 
 7. Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2008, at A1. 
 8. Drinan, supra note 6 (manuscript at 19). 
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“second-generation” suits differ in kind from the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims that public rights litigators filed in previous decades.9  
Many of the recent suits are “state-court class-actions, challenging objec-
tive criteria, such as excessive attorney caseloads [and] meager rates of at-
torney compensation.”10  In other words, these second-generation suits de-
pend on data that quantitatively demonstrate the inadequacy of the relevant 
state’s public defense system.  Without specific and reliable programmatic 
information about “excessive” caseloads and “meager” compensation rates, 
the litigators pushing these suits could not have articulated—let alone real-
ized—their reform goals. 
Over the last half century, Congress and state legislatures have adopted 
“right-to-know” laws that improve public access to this sort of information.  
For example, subject to certain exemptions,11 the Freedom of Information 
Act12 (“FOIA”) grants “‘any person’” the right to request and receive “‘any 
record’ in the possession and control of a federal agency, government cor-
poration, or other federal entity.”13  Additionally, the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act14 (“FACA”) and Government in the Sunshine Act15 direct 
certain committees and agencies, respectively, to open their meetings to the 
public.16  Comparable state open-records and open-meeting laws govern 
disclosure of information about state and local government activities.17  
Additionally,  various subject-specific statutes also mandate disclosure of 
particular categories of government information.  To meet the requirements 
of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006,18 for 
instance, the George W. Bush (“Bush”) Administration created a public 
searchable database of all “government contract, grant and other award 
data.”19 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006) (listing exemptions). 
 12. § 552. 
 13. David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of 
Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L REV. 1787, 1787 (2008) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(3), (b)(1)-(9)). 
 14. 5 U.S.C. app. §§1-16 (2006). 
 15. § 552(b). 
 16. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1989) (detailing the 
basic requirements of and exceptions to FACA); FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 
U.S. 463, 469-74 (1984) (same for the Government in the Sunshine Act). 
 17. See The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Open Government Guide, 
http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2009) (providing an excellent, full-text 
searchable guide to every state’s open records and open meetings laws). 
 18. Pub. L. No. 109-282, 120 Stat. 1186 (2006). 
 19. USAspending, http://www.usaspending.gov/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2009). 
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These laws are far from perfect, of course.  A few recently-identified 
weaknesses of particular relevance to public rights advocates include the 
laws’ vulnerability to selective and highly politicized enforcement,20 and 
their susceptibility to narrowing by the courts.21  In addition, critics note 
that the laws are “reactive,” requiring interested parties to request and then 
wait to receive relevant government records rather than simply making all 
non-classified records available in searchable databases.22  State informa-
tion laws suffer from similar flaws.  For example, like FOIA, most are re-
active.23  Numerous authors have suggested practical reforms to correct 
these and other problems with the right-to-know laws, including amending 
open-records laws to mandate that agencies post some categories of records 
on the internet without waiting for a formal request.24  Overall, whether 
public rights advocates tell a glass-half-full or half-empty story about our 
current network of right-to-know laws is a question of perspective.  While 
the existing laws do provide access to some information essential to effec-
tive litigation, their many shortcomings may delay or even derail litigation 
efforts in particular situations.25 
 
 20. Vladeck, supra note 13, at 1790; see also Minjeong Kim, Numbers Tell Part of the 
Story:  A Comparison of FOIA Implementation under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, 
12 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313, 337 (2007) (describing results of quantitative study that “sup-
ports the prevailing perception among scholars and public access advocacy groups that the 
Bush administration has sought to limit the scope of the FOIA and has impaired the effec-
tiveness of the FOIA as an instrument of access”). 
 21. Michael J. Mongan, Fixing FACA:  The Case for Exempting Presidential Advisory 
Committees from Judicial Review Under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 895, 905 (2005) (making that case with respect to FACA). 
 22. Vladeck, supra note 13, at 1789.  But see Memorandum from the White House to 
the Heads of Executive Dep’ts and Agencies re: Freedom of Information Act (Jan. 21, 
2009), available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/federal-eye/2009/01/_in_a_move_ 
that.html?hpid=topnews (directing all agencies to “adopt a presumption in favor of disclo-
sures”; noting that this presumption “means agencies should take affirmative steps to make 
information public” in a timely way; and directing the attorney general to issue and publish 
new FOIA guidelines “reaffirming the commitment to accountability and transparency”); 
Memorandum from the White House to the Heads of Executive Dep’ts and Agencies re:  
Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), available at 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/federal-eye/2009/01/_in_a_move_that.html?hpid= 
topnews (directing the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to issue, within 
120 days, recommendations on establishing “a system of transparency, public participation, 
and collaboration” in government). 
 23. See Open Government Guide, supra note 17 (comparison of all fifty states’ provi-
sions regarding “On-line dissemination” of information). 
 24. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 13, at 1828-36 (noting “Three Proposals for Re-
form”). 
 25. Id., at 1799-1809 (detailing the legal hoops through which the Natural Resources 
Defense Council had to jump just to procure basic data on government use and disposal of 
the groundwater contaminant perchlorate—data obviously essential to any subsequent effort 
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Even if the laws were perfect, though, they could not solve two other ac-
cess-to-information dilemmas for public rights litigators: (1) how to sift the 
vast quantities of public information for material that is useful, either be-
cause it evinces a violation of a widely-shared right, or because it could 
support legal action to vindicate such a right, and (2) how to obtain simi-
larly useful information that is not publicly available (because, for exam-
ple, it is classified26 or qualifies for the deliberative process privilege27).  
The second dilemma speaks for itself, but the first requires some elabora-
tion.  The problem arises because federal and state governments generate 
enormous quantities of information.  To cite just a few statistics on the fed-
eral side, the Federal Register, in which U.S. agencies publish all manner 
of actions, “weigh[ed] in” at 72,090 pages in 2007,28 for a generation rate 
of about 200 pages per day.  More overwhelming still, agencies must main-
tain a rulemaking record for many of the regulatory actions described in the 
Federal Register, and those records are often massive, comprising thou-
sands or tens of thousands of pages of exhibits, hearing transcripts, agency 
reports, and comments by outside parties.29  Searchable online databases of 
that information would do little to help public rights advocates sort the 
wheat from the chaff: the legally actionable conduct from the simply irre-
sponsible from the utterly routine and reasonable.  Diligent and fortuitous 
litigators might occasionally chance on a “smoking gun” in such a data-
base, but thorough and effective culling of all or even most of the inculpa-
tory or otherwise useful records requires a different kind of information: 
 
to request court assistance in forcing the responsible government agencies to clean up per-
chlorate-contaminated sites). 
 26. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006).  Lest there be any doubt, such disclosures are ex-
tremely common.  See, e.g., Michael Charlson, The Constitutionality of Expanding Prepub-
lication Review of Government Employees’ Speech, 72 CAL. L. REV. 962, 966 (1984) (indi-
cating that in some administrations, unauthorized disclosure of classified information is “a 
routine daily occurrence” (citing REP. OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON UNAUTHOR-
IZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, at B1 (1982))). 
 27. See generally Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rec-
ognizing that FOIA § 552(b)(5) incorporates the deliberative process privilege, which gen-
erally exempts from disclosure “agency documents that are both predecisional and delibera-
tive”). 
 28. JAMES GATTUSO, RED TAPE RISING:  REGULATORY TRENDS IN THE BUSH YEARS; 
BACKGROUNDER #2116 (2008), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/regulation/ 
bg2116.cfm#_ftn14. 
 29. See, e.g., Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) v. Dep’t of Labor, 100 F.3d 991, 
992 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing the “largest record in [the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s] rulemaking history-more than 335,000 pages”); Nader v. Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm’n, 513 F.2d 1045, 1050 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussing a record that “in-
volved months of hearings, over 22,000 pages of transcript, and thousands of pages of ex-
hibits”). 
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guidance from someone intimately familiar with the government activities 
under scrutiny. 
To give a concrete example of both information dilemmas in action, 
suppose a public rights group concerned about agency “capture”30 by a 
regulated industry wishes to challenge as arbitrary and capricious31 all en-
vironmental and public health and safety regulations in which a particular 
agency gave insufficient credence to the findings of staff scientists and 
placed excessive weight on the comments of industry lobbyists.  With re-
spect to the information published in the Federal Register or available in 
corresponding record pages, an inside source may be necessary to help the 
group locate and identify every example—or even just the most egregious 
examples—of arguable procedural misconduct (dilemma 1).  Moreover, the 
group has no access to internal agency deliberations,32 so even if the 
agency’s private files contain smoking-gun evidence of information-
processing irregularities—for instance, a redlined document clearly indicat-
ing that the agency edited an internal scientific report to redact all refer-
ences to a certain scientist’s findings and recommendations—the group 
cannot obtain that evidence without assistance from an informant (dilemma 
2).  At least in the regulatory context, then, efficient and effective use of 
public rights litigation to drive coherent, coordinated change in government 
policy depends crucially on access to inside information from public offi-
cials “in the know”—that is, on some form of whistleblowing.33 
What of public rights advocates who seek to vindicate aggregated indi-
vidual rights, though, such as the litigators who have worked over the last 
 
 30. See generally Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition:  
Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 876 (1973) (warning of agency capture); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1684-88 (1975) (critiquing the “‘capture’ scenario, in which administrations are sys-
tematically controlled, sometimes corruptly, by the business firms within their orbit of re-
sponsibility, whether regulatory or promotional”). 
 31. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006). 
 32. See supra note 27 (discussing the deliberative process privilege). 
 33. To be sure, government whistleblowing may also have adverse consequences, in-
cluding breaches of national security.  See, e.g., Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the 
Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008, at 3 (“‘You can’t have runoffs deciding they’re going 
to be the white knight and running to the press,’ says Frances Fragos Townsend, who . . . 
served as President Bush’s chief counterterrorism adviser. . . . ‘There are legal processes in 
place [for whistleblowers’ complaints.  Ignoring those processes is] incredibly danger-
ous.’”).  Any effort to design legal, ethical, or practical reforms to encourage or redirect 
whistleblowing must of course consider these adverse consequences as well as the legiti-
mate uses of inside information to vindicate public rights.  This Article, though, focuses nar-
rowly on the latter issue, in an effort to develop an analytical model that could eventually be 
of use in such a reform effort. 
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several decades to reform prison conditions?34  When a public rights viola-
tion directly harms individuals, one might at first assume that whistleblow-
ing is less essential, because the affected individuals can provide advocates 
with information about their alleged mistreatment.  Here too, though, whis-
tleblowers may prove invaluable, because any attempt to achieve system-
atic change depends for its success on information about the scope and per-
sistence of the identified rights violation.  Continuing the prison conditions 
example, suppose several inmates of a particular prison approach a public 
rights advocate to complain about denial of medical treatment.  The advo-
cate could content himself with filing a series of lawsuits on behalf of those 
inmates, or he could instead seek to build a broader case alleging institu-
tion-wide misconduct.35  Information from the individual inmate-plaintiffs 
might be sufficient to support the former lawsuits, but the success of the 
latter case would turn on obtaining comprehensive information about con-
ditions behind the closed doors of the prison—information unavailable (di-
lemma 2), or at least far more difficult to locate and obtain (dilemma 1), 
without the assistance of a guard or other insider. 
These examples suggest that one cannot assess the effectiveness of sys-
temic public rights litigation without asking a series of seemingly digres-
sive questions about government whistleblowers and the information they 
provide.  For example: 
• Can one categorize government whistleblowers in a way that sheds 
light on their role in fostering (or hindering) public rights litigation? 
• If such categorization is possible, what types of whistleblowers are 
most useful to public rights litigators? 
• Is the information that government whistleblowers provide usually 
complete?  If not, what kinds of information are whistleblowers most 
likely to overlook, ignore, or decline to disclose? 
• Relatedly, to what degree do government whistleblowers’ personal or 
political agendas or biases distort the information they disclose? 
 
 34. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND 
THE MODERN STATE:  HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 39-42 (1998) (not-
ing that cases in almost all U.S. jurisdictions have contributed to reform on issues ranging 
from prison food service to medical care to inmate education); Charles F. Sabel & William 
H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:  How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1015, 1034-43 (2004) (surveying public law litigation in the area of prison reform). 
 35. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 34, at 1039-40 (discussing the settlement 
agreement in Plata v. Davis, No. C-01-1351 TEH (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2002), in which the 
California Department of Corrections “agreed to structural relief centered on a quality as-
surance system with significant accountability to outside professionals and the plaintiff 
class”). 
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• How do advocates who receive whistleblower disclosures sort useful, 
accurate, and complete information from information that is untrue, 
biased, incomplete, or otherwise misleading? 
• To what extent do federal and state legal and ethical regimes—
including whistleblower statutes, constitutional privileges, and profes-
sional ethics rules—create “signal distortions” between whistleblowers 
and public rights advocates? 
• In particular, do current legal and ethical regimes encourage complete 
and accurate whistleblowing by the most important type(s) of whistle-
blower?  If not, should the incentive structure be modified? 
• On the flip side, is there reason to be concerned that such incentives 
regularly promote disclosure of inaccurate or otherwise misleading in-
formation?  If so, should the incentive structure be modified? 
• Relatedly, can public rights advocates do anything to encourage use-
ful, accurate, and complete disclosures, and discourage untrue, biased, 
incomplete, or otherwise misleading disclosures? 
II.  FACTORS AFFECTING WHISTLEBLOWER UTILITY 
This Article uses the term “government whistleblower” quite expan-
sively, to include anyone who assists a public rights advocate with one of 
the information dilemmas identified above—that is, anyone who publicly 
discloses government information that would otherwise be difficult or im-
possible for the public to discover or obtain, from a short memorandum that 
had been buried in a lengthy rulemaking docket, to a classified document, 
to a personal insight about the way that an issue is playing out in the halls 
of an agency.36  Importantly, it is irrelevant whether the whistleblower’s 
information directly evidences substantive wrongdoing.  A hint at possible 
procedural irregularities in a rulemaking record, or even just a suggestion 
of a fruitful avenue for further research, may be all that a public rights ad-
vocate needs to redirect and enhance his litigation efforts.  Thus, almost 
 
 36. Note that this is not the only nor even the most common definition.  C. Fred Alford, 
for example, uses the term narrowly, to refer only to government employees who “experi-
ence[] retaliation” for their whistleblowing.  C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS:  BROKEN 
LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 18 (2001).  A popular textbook on whistleblowing 
states that “[t]he most common [legal] conception of a whistleblower is of an employee who 
reports his or her employer’s violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement agency.”  
DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING:  THE LAW OF RETALIA-
TORY DISCHARGE 22 (2nd ed. 2004).  That textbook itself uses the term to “refer to employ-
ees who oppose, either internally, or externally, their employers’ conduct[,] based on the 
employee’s belief that the employer’s conduct is illegal, unethical, or dangerous.”  Id. at 22-
23. 
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any government insider who says anything “off the record” about her em-
ployer’s activities qualifies as a whistleblower for purposes of this discus-
sion. 
From the point of view of a public rights advocate, however, not all such 
whistleblowers are created equal.  Some consistently provide useful and 
accurate information, while others fail to follow through, or waste advo-
cates’ time with tantalizing hints at wrongdoing that later prove biased or 
false.37  What traits, then, maximize a government whistleblower’s utility 
to an outside advocate?  A complete, empirically substantiated list must 
await a comprehensive survey of advocates and whistleblowers, but eight 
important traits come readily to mind: 
• Most obviously, the whistleblower must have access to relevant in-
formation (access). 
• In addition, she must be able to recognize what sorts of information 
would be of use to a particular advocate (insight). 
• She must be willing to disclose that information outside her em-
ployer’s organization, even though doing so may betray the trust of her 
employer and colleagues, breach her profession’s code of ethics, risk 
retaliation, and possibly violate the law (determination). 
• Even though she may be dissembling or violating confidentiality rules 
at work, she must be honest in her dealings with the outside advocate 
(honesty). 
• Further, she must correctly understand the information she passes 
on—no amount of honesty can make up for a whistleblower’s mis-
taken initial perception of, for example, a conversation she overheard 
(comprehension). 
• Relatedly, her information must not be compromised by personal or 
political prejudices (bias). 
• She must be willing to seek out concrete information and pursue any 
new leads (perseverance). 
• Finally, she is useful to the outside advocate only so long as she re-
tains her government position and her access to information (longev-
ity). 
The remainder of this Article refers to these eight traits by their short-
hand labels: access, insight, determination, honesty, comprehension, bias, 
perseverance, and longevity. 
 
 37. Interview with anonymous source, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 16, 2009). 
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III.  ASSESSING THE UTILITY OF REAL WHISTLEBLOWERS 
To determine whether public rights advocates make optimal use of gov-
ernment whistleblowers, then, one must somehow assess the degree to 
which advocates rely on whistleblowers who have access, insight, and de-
termination; who are honest, accurate, and unbiased; who persevere; and 
who enjoy employment longevity.  Unfortunately, one cannot survey for 
many of these traits; even an honest and forthcoming whistleblower cannot 
truthfully answer the question, “do personal or political prejudices bias 
your perceptions of information?”  One can, however, gain insight into 
these somewhat intangible traits by investigating six concrete characteris-
tics of the whistleblower and her whistleblowing activities: the whistle-
blower’s job description; her attitude toward her agency and the admini-
stration as a whole; her political and professional views and relationships; 
the professional context in which she made her disclosure; the manner of 
her disclosure; and the legal and ethical regimes under which she made that 
disclosure.  Whenever the discussion of these issues implicates one of the 
eight traits listed in Part II, above, that trait is identified in parentheses at 
the end of the relevant sentence. 
A. Job Description 
Several aspects of a whistleblower’s job description may give insights 
into her utility as an informant.  For example, how senior is the whistle-
blower?  Is she a lawyer, a scientist, or a member of another profession that 
promulgates ethical guidelines?  Does she hold a policy position or a tech-
nical or support position?  What job protections does she enjoy?  The an-
swers to these questions are relevant for several reasons.  For one thing, the 
more senior a government employee is, and the higher her security clear-
ance,38 the more access she has to inside information, and the more likely 
she is to encounter information useful to public rights litigators (access).  In 
addition, a whistleblower’s professional role may affect her willingness to 
disclose information to legislators, reporters, or public rights advocates (de-
termination).  Government lawyers, for example, have ethical obligations 
 
 38. According to the Government Accountability Project (“GAP”), a whistleblower sup-
port group, “the most common harassment technique” against national security whistle-
blowers is to “yank their security clearances.”  Protection for National Security Whistle-
blowers Before the H. Gov’t Reform Comm., 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Thomas 
Devine, Legal Director, Government Accountability Project).  This mode of retaliation “can 
lead to . . . indefinite suspension or termination” of the whistleblower if her job requires 
clearance, but it is neither prohibited under current law nor subject to judicial review.  See 
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats:  The Press and National Se-
curity Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 248 (2008). 
LEITER_CHRISTENSEN 6/8/2009  8:37:58 PM 
758 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
to their client agencies that may make it professionally impossible for them 
to disclose even the most incriminating evidence of those agencies’ wrong-
doing.39  In contrast, members of some other professions, including engi-
neering, have an ethical obligation to disclose some types of wrongdoing 
by colleagues or superiors.40  Finally, the terms of a government whistle-
blower’s employment contract—in particular job security, but also such 
considerations as eligibility for performance awards41—may affect both her 
willingness to risk disapprobation by disclosing inside information about 
her employer’s conduct (determination), and the likelihood that she will es-
cape termination or other severe and access-limiting retaliation (longevity). 
B. Attitude 
The second characteristic relevant to a potential whistleblower’s utility 
to public rights litigators is her attitude toward the governing administra-
tion and toward her employer agency.  On the first point, a career official 
or (perhaps more commonly) political appointee who agrees with most ad-
ministration policy choices may be disinclined to betray the administration 
by disclosing procedural irregularities or other evidence of potential 
wrongdoing (determination).42  Even more fundamentally, though, she may 
be unlikely to perceive that her agency’s mode of implementing policy 
 
 39. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for example, 
permit limited disclosure of information relating to client representation, but only in con-
texts in which such disclosure will prevent future harms or mitigate past financial wrongdo-
ing committed with the aid of the lawyer.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2), 
(3) (2003); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 36, at 35 (discussing professional 
ethical codes affecting whistleblowing).  More anecdotally, public rights litigators report 
that they rarely receive information from government lawyer whistleblowers.  Interview 
with anonymous source, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 12-13, 2008). 
 40. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 36, at 35 (quoting Nat’l Soc.’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 
CODE OF ETHICS FOR ENGINEERS II:1:A; III:2:B (2003)). 
 41. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5384 (2006) (providing for performance awards for “excellence 
in performance by career appointees” in the senior executive service). 
 42. There do not appear to be studies documenting the effect of junior agency employ-
ees’ party affiliation on whistleblowing, but the effect at the cabinet level has been noted 
(and lauded).  Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 865, 901 (2007) (emphasizing the importance of a bipartisan presidential cabinet, and 
noting particularly that “[b]y . . . inviting a potential whistleblower into the tent, bipartisan-
ship helps to dispel the suspicion that policy decisions rest on partisan motives or extreme 
preferences”).  For empirical documentation of the effect of party affiliation on whistle-
blowing in a different context, see Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisan-
ship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:  Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals 
107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998) (arguing, with empirical evidence, that when an appellate 
review panel is split 2-1 in (presumptive) political affiliation, the “minority member acts as 
a whistleblower, ready to expose any [effort] by the majority” to discount relevant legal 
principles). 
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choices contravenes governing laws (bias).43  On the other hand, an official 
or appointee who disagrees with the policies of the governing administra-
tion, or who is disgruntled by her work environment for nonpolitical rea-
sons, may perceive wrongdoing even in routine administration actions 
(bias), and may be relatively eager to disclose any such wrongdoing to ad-
ministration critics outside her agency (determination).  Finally, studies 
suggest, perhaps counterintuitively, that loyalty to one’s employer organi-
zation tends to foster rather than discourage whistleblowing, because most 
whistleblowers view themselves not as undermining their organization but 
as “defending the true mission of [the] organization by resisting illicit prac-
tices.”44  Thus, employees who self-identify as loyal to an agency’s mission 
may be more rather than less inclined to blow the whistle when they dis-
cover irregularities (determination). 
These observations lead to somewhat contradictory conclusions about 
whistleblower utility.  On the one hand, public rights advocates seeking to 
monitor an agency’s actions may face a risk of under-disclosure of wrong-
doing from those agency employees sympathetic to administration policy, 
and simultaneously from disaffected employees who cannot be bothered to 
seek or disclose wrongdoing.  On the other hand, such advocates may face 
a risk of over-disclosure from those employees who view every administra-
tion action with heavy skepticism, and simultaneously from those employ-
ees so committed to the organization’s broad mission that they view any 
perceived detours from that mission as clear evidence of wrongdoing. 
C. Political and Professional Views and Relationships 
A government employee’s political views also affect her utility as a 
whistleblower, especially if those views coincide with the present configu-
ration of the legislature.  Tight connections to the party in power in one or 
 
 43. On the effects of “cultural worldview,” including political affiliations on individ-
ual’s perceptions of fact, see generally Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes are You Going to 
Believe?  Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 
(2009).  The authors showed 1350 Americans a video of the police chase at issue in Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).  Describing the audience’s varied perceptions of the video, 
they note that: 
Social psychology teaches us that our perceptions of fact are pervasively shaped 
by our . . . views of individual virtue and social justice.  It also tells us that al-
though our ability to perceive this type of value-motivated cognition in others is 
quite acute, our power to perceive it in ourselves tends to be quite poor.  We thus . 
. . experience overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of [our] factual per-
ceptions. 
Id. at 842-43. 
 44. MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS:  EXPOS-
ING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 6 (1989). 
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both houses of Congress, for instance, may encourage an agency employee 
to blow the whistle on apparent irregularities at her agency—particularly if 
the majority party in the relevant house differs from that of the current ad-
ministration, thereby guaranteeing the whistleblower a receptive audience 
(bias and determination).  Also relevant are any contacts the whistleblower 
may have “with congressmen who might assist them and with committees 
investigating issues about which [the whistleblowers] could provide unique 
evidence” (determination).45 
Politics are not, however, the only source of bias; a whistleblower’s pro-
fessional ties are also important.  For example, a government employee 
who formerly worked for a regulated industry may be more likely to see, 
and more willing to disclose, signs of unlawful over-regulation (bias and 
determination).  Further, the reverse may be true of an agency insider who 
has a close relationship with a group that advocates more stringent regula-
tion in a particular area. 
Finally, professional and personal connections bear on traits other than 
bias.  For example, a whistleblower with strong ties to a public rights group 
may be better able to recognize information that the group would find use-
ful (insight).  From the group’s perspective, those ties provide some reas-
surance that the information the whistleblower provides is both true and ac-
curate (honesty and comprehension). 
D. Context 
The fourth issue to consider is the job context in which the whistle-
blower makes her disclosure.  Some government whistleblowers disclose 
inculpatory or otherwise politically compromising information about their 
employers in connection with adverse employment decisions.  In May 
2008, for example, former Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Re-
gion V Administrator Mary Gade resigned from her position, offering the 
inflammatory explanation that the EPA Administrator had pushed her to 
leave because she had been too aggressive in pressuring a company suppor-
tive of the Bush Administration to clean up contaminated company prop-
erty.46  In contrast, other informants blow the whistle in the course of doing 
their jobs—sometimes literally so, as illustrated by Los Angeles County 
Deputy District Attorney Richard Ceballos, who warned his supervisors 
 
 45. Id. at 35-36. 
 46. Michael Hawthorne, EPA Official Ousted While Fighting Dow, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 
2008, at 1. 
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that a warrant affidavit in a pending criminal case contained what he con-
sidered to be “serious misrepresentations.”47 
In a subsequent lawsuit, Garcetti v. Ceballos,48 Ceballos alleged that “he 
was subjected to a series of [unconstitutional] employment actions” in re-
taliation for this warning.49  The Supreme Court’s decision in Ceballos’s 
case establishes that the circumstances of a disclosure affect the legal pro-
tections afforded the whistleblower, with a government employee who dis-
closes information “as a citizen addressing matters of public concern” re-
ceiving greater First Amendment protections than a course-of-employment 
whistleblower like Ceballos50—a discrepancy that may well affect a 
course-of-employment whistleblower’s willingness to disclose (determina-
tion).  The circumstances implicate other incentives for disclosure as well, 
though, and may also bear on the reliability of the information disclosed.  
Specifically, whistleblowers facing adverse employment decisions, espe-
cially termination, have less reason to fear such employment consequences 
as a reprisal for their disclosure (determination).  On the other hand, these 
whistleblowers have every incentive to perceive—or even invent51—
government wrongdoing in connection with their termination, demotion, or 
denial of promotion (bias and honesty).  In contrast, potential whistleblow-
ers who have not yet suffered adverse professional consequences may be 
disinclined to risk those consequences by coming forward (determina-
tion),52 but there is correspondingly less reason for an advocate to fear that 
personal grievances taint whatever information the whistleblower ulti-
mately chooses to disclose (bias and honesty).53 
 
 47. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414 (2006). 
 48. Id. at 410. 
 49. Id. at 415. 
 50. Id. at 417, 426 (concluding that a government whistleblower who alleges wrongdo-
ing privately, to a supervisor, pursuant to his official duties, is not entitled to First Amend-
ment protections). 
 51. Indeed, later news stories suggested that Mary Gade may have done just that.  See 
Officials Question Claims Region V Head Forced to Quit over Cleanup, INSIDE EPA, May 
9, 2008, available at http://governmentdocs.org/Doc/PageView.aspx?DocId=1603&Pag 
Num=1. 
 52. See infra Part II.F for a discussion of current whistleblower laws. 
 53. But see ALFORD, supra note 36.  Alford argues that 
The key organizational strategy [in response to whistleblowing] is to transform the 
act of whistleblowing from an issue of policy and principle into an act of private 
disobedience and psychological disturbance. . . . The academic study of whistle-
blowers should not unwittingly repeat the disciplinary strategy of the organization 
in the guise of an intellectual strategy that makes whistleblower psychology or the 
intellectual and ethical purity of the whistleblower’s case central. 
Id. at 32. 
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E. Manner of disclosure 
The next issue is the manner in which a whistleblower makes her disclo-
sure.  On one extreme are whistleblowers who risk their jobs, careers, and 
sometimes even personal lives54 to disclose strong evidence of substan-
tively illegal or procedurally irregular conduct by employers or colleagues.  
These “active” whistleblowers may make their disclosures externally (to 
legislators, journalists, or advocates), or they may express their concerns to 
colleagues or supervisors—and possibly also the public—in the course of 
employment or via resignation.55  Examples of active, purely “external”56 
whistleblowers abound, from Mark Felt, the recently deceased Deep Throat 
of the Watergate scandal,57 to Thomas Tamm, the Justice Department law-
yer who disclosed his concerns about the Bush Administration’s war-
rantless surveillance program to New York Times reporter Eric Lichtblau.58  
Their stories are the stuff of legend—and of Hollywood.59 
As for active whistleblowers who chose first to express their concerns 
internally, the Bush Administration affords three ready examples: Jason 
Burnett, former Associate Deputy Administrator of EPA, who resigned his 
job in June 2008 over alleged political interference with the agency’s ef-
forts to decide, as a scientific matter, whether greenhouse gases endanger 
public health and so should be regulated under the Clean Air Act;60 FBI at-
torney Colleen Rowley, who wrote a now-public memo to Director Robert 
Mueller accusing the Bureau of failing to aggressively investigate 9/11 co-
 
 54. See, e.g., TOM DEVINE, GAP, THE WHISTLEBLOWER’S SURVIVAL GUIDE:  COURAGE 
WITHOUT MARTYRDOM 7 (1997) (“Time and again, GAP has seen whistleblowers pay an 
enormous professional and personal price for their actions . . . .”); id. at 27-39 (detailing the 
types of harassment and intimidation to which whistleblowers may be subject). 
 55. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 36, at 23 (defining four “useful categories” of 
whistleblowers:  “passive” whistleblowers, who make their disclosures in response to offi-
cial inquiries; “active” whistleblowers, who “take affirmative steps to oppose their employ-
ers’ conduct”; within the active category, “internal” and “external” whistleblowers, who 
make their disclosures within or outside their employers’ organizations, respectively; and 
“embryonic” whistleblowers, who are discharged before they are able to make their disclo-
sures). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Tim Weiner, W. Mark Felt, Watergate Deep Throat, Dies at 95, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
19, 2008, at B11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/washington/19felt.html? 
fta=y#. 
 58. Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008, at 40. 
 59. See, e.g., CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974) 
(recounting the authors’ efforts to uncover the details of the Watergate scandal, with help 
from a shadowy figure then known only as Deep Throat); ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (War-
ner Bros. Pictures 1976) (same). 
 60. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, A New (and Unlikely) Tell-All, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 
2008, at A13. 
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conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui;61 and Michael Kelly, a National Marine 
Fisheries Service scientist, who first sought federal whistleblower protec-
tion and later resigned from the Service over concerns that his political su-
periors had violated the Endangered Species Act by pressuring him to alter 
his findings on the minimum water levels necessary to protect endangered 
coho salmon in the Klamath River.62  Plainly, then, active whistleblowers 
are ubiquitous; it should come as no surprise, therefore, that they are also 
well explored in the academic literature.63 
An untold number of government informants, however, engage in an en-
tirely different form of whistleblowing, which might be termed “insinuat-
ing.”  These whistleblowers keep a much lower profile, disclosing small 
bits of interest-provoking but not particularly damning information to con-
gressional committees, journalists, or advocacy groups, via unlabeled enve-
lopes, anonymous phone calls, or “off the record” conversations.  Insinu-
ators act at the margins, and (by definition) they never pass on truly 
inculpatory evidence.  Instead, they provide hints and innuendo designed to 
trigger or facilitate an outside party’s investigation into a government pro-
gram or action about which the whistleblower has procedural, ethical, or 
legal concerns. 
For example, one longtime public interest lawyer and former govern-
ment official, who declines to be named, regularly meets his government 
sources on an unidentified floor of an unidentified building in downtown 
Washington, DC, to receive unlabeled brown envelopes containing bits of 
information about pending agency rulemakings.64  Much of this informa-
tion would be available through less covert channels (including FOIA re-
quests).  That is, the information itself is rarely classified or otherwise un-
discoverable.  Often, therefore, what is most important about these covert 
communications is not the contents of the envelope but the meta-
information conveyed by the passing of the envelope: “the document in this 
envelope is important; be sure to consider it as you develop your advocacy 
in this area.” 
 
 61. Threats and Responses; Excerpts From F.B.I. Agent’s Letter to Director Mueller, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at A15. 
 62. Natalie M. Henry, Klamath:  Whistleblower Says NMFS Violated ESA when Decid-
ing How to Protect Salmon, ENERGY & ENV’T DAILY, March 20, 2003, available at 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2003/03/20/8; Whistleblower Resigns After 2nd 
Dispute with Agency, ENERGY & ENV’T DAILY, May 20, 2004, available at 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2004/05/20/archive/7?terms=%22michael+kelly%22. 
 63. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 36; GLAZER & GLAZER, supra note 44 (recounting and 
analyzing whistleblowers’ stories). 
 64. Interview with anonymous source, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 12-13, 2008). 
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Some insinuators choose to pass on the same kind of information over 
lunch or a cocktail or at a professional association meeting, discreetly let-
ting it be known that, “The rulemaking on X is generating a lot of political 
controversy within the agency,” or “A lobbyist for group Z made interest-
ing comments on rulemaking X at an agency meeting today,” or even, 
seemingly innocuously, “The agency plans to issue rule X on Monday.”  In 
the first two examples, the insinuator discloses almost no actual informa-
tion, but the recipient of the disclosure nevertheless receives critical guid-
ance: inquire further into the specifics of rulemaking X, via docket searches 
or FOIA requests; additionally, determine whether the agency held meet-
ings with group Z and, if so, whether any interest groups were excluded 
from the meetings.  Even the third, far blander example provides helpful, 
previously nonpublic intelligence to a busy public rights advocate: ready 
your response to the rulemaking, and alert the press, so that the earliest 
news reports include not just the agency’s explanation of the need for the 
rule, but also the affected community’s reaction thereto. 
Just as for job description and the other issues discussed above, the 
manner of a whistleblower’s disclosure—active whistleblowing or insinuat-
ing—may provide significant insight into her overall utility to public rights 
advocates.  Consider, for example, the watchdog group described above, 
which seeks to monitor agency capture and challenge any rules or policies 
tainted thereby.65  An active whistleblower may provide information that 
leads the group to a particularly egregious example of such capture.  More-
over, the group can verify that information with relative ease, because 
(again, by definition) the information evinces some form of procedural or 
substantive wrongdoing and is therefore likely to become the subject of 
public discussion and evaluation (honesty, comprehension, and bias).  On 
the other hand, an active whistleblower may not be systematically helpful 
to the hypothetical group, because she is unlikely to have access to simi-
larly telling evidence of every or even most occasions on which the agency 
arbitrarily and capriciously acceded to the wishes of a regulated entity (ac-
cess)—and unless she carefully covers her tracks in making her initial dis-
closure, she may quickly lose whatever access she once had (longevity).66 
To discover other occasions of similar misconduct, therefore, the group 
is likely to turn to insinuators, who are willing to identify relevant record 
filings (“check out industry Z’s comments on rulemaking X”), or even just 
to suggest profitable avenues of further research (“the agency is struggling 
 
 65. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 66. DEVINE, supra note 54, at 32-33, 43-45 (discussing isolation techniques and noting 
that “employers may seek not only to punish whistleblowers, but also to make it impossible 
for them to gain access to information and evidence”). 
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with rulemaking X; the outcome is likely to be controversial”).  Because 
such whistleblowers provide little substantive information, they are better 
able to maintain their anonymity over time—thereby both reducing the risk 
that they lose their jobs (access and longevity) and permitting them to de-
velop relationships of trust with the advocates with whom they regularly 
communicate (insight, honesty, comprehension, and longevity).  Again, 
though, there is a tradeoff: the more circumspect the whistleblowing activ-
ity, the more reason there may be to question the whistleblower’s accuracy.  
For one thing, such low-level whistleblowing requires little investment 
from the whistleblower; she can simply communicate her concern without 
having to produce hard evidence (perseverance).  Thus, insinuators may be 
tempted to pass on any suspicion of procedural or substantive irregularities 
(bias).  Moreover, a government employee who is willing to regularly have 
“off the record” conversations with an outside group may have her own po-
litical or personal axe to grind.  The whistleblower’s motivation may taint 
the information she provides (honesty and bias),67 but even if it does not, 
the information recipient may find itself in a quandary, eager to pursue all 
significant instances of misconduct, but stretched too thin or even publicly 
discredited if it chases all of the whistleblower’s leads with equal zeal (in-
sight). 
F. Legal and Ethical Regimes 
A thorough exposition of the federal and state legal and ethical regimes 
governing whistleblowing is well beyond the scope of this Article.  One 
can gain some insight into the relevance of this issue for whistleblower util-
ity, however, by considering whether the constitutional and statutory pro-
tections for federal employees go as far as they could to encourage high 
utility whistleblowers to come forward.  The short answer is no. 
To begin with, as discussed above,68 the Supreme Court recently nar-
rowed First Amendment protections for government employees, holding 
that such protections do not extend to employees disciplined for “speech 
made pursuant to [their] official duties.”69  As FBI whistleblower Colleen 
Rowley warned ahead of the Garcetti decision, the absence of such protec-
tions presents federal employees, particularly those who work in national 
security, with three equally grim choices: (1) ignore the perceived wrong-
doing; (2) risk retaliation by trying “to remedy [the perceived] problem 
within the system,” or (3) risk public disapprobation—and perhaps the Na-
 
 67. See supra note 43. 
 68. Supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 69. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414 (2006). 
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tion’s safety—by ignoring official reporting channels and instead disclos-
ing concerns to the press or other outsiders.70 
In reaching its cramped reading of the First Amendment, the Garcetti 
Court asserted that a “powerful network of legislative enactments—such as 
whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes”—protect “those who seek 
to expose wrongdoing.”71  As the dissent observes, however, this claim 
“fails on its own terms.”72  Consider, for example, the Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act (“WPA”),73 which was enacted in 1989 and strengthened in 
1994.  For federal workers, the WPA offers the most substantial legislative 
bulwark against retaliation, yet some combination of the act itself and fed-
eral case law interpreting its provisions belies the Garcetti majority’s con-
fident assertion. 
As relevant to the importance of government whistleblowing to effective 
public rights litigation, the WPA has four main shortcomings: it is underin-
clusive; whistleblowers challenging retaliation bear an almost prohibitive 
burden of proof; whistleblowers receive no protection for internal disclo-
sures; and (partly as a result of the burden of proof problem) the adminis-
trative and judicial avenues available for challenging retaliation are almost 
entirely unavailing.  On the first point, the Act extends only to retaliatory 
action taken against an employee for disclosure of information the “em-
ployee . . . reasonably believes evidences (i) a violation of any law, rule, or 
regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse 
of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or 
safety.”74  This provision plainly falls short of protecting the less overt 
form of whistleblowing, insinuating, because insinuators do not provide di-
rect evidence of any substantial wrongdoing, instead merely offering guid-
ance about potentially profitable avenues of investigation.  Indeed, insinu-
ators may not themselves be certain that any “violation of . . . law” or 
“gross” or “substantial” misconduct has occurred.  They may simply have 
concerns about the direction their agency is headed, and wish to alert advo-
cates, journalists, and members of Congress to increase outside pressure on 
the agency to “do the right thing.”  Under the express terms of the WPA, 
however, an employer may lawfully retaliate against an employee who 
communicates such nebulous suspicions. 
 
 70. Colleen Rowley & Dylan Blaylock, Occupational Hazard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
2005, at A19. 
 71. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (citing the Whistleblower Protection Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 
2302(b)(8) (2006); CAL. GOVT. CODE § 8547.8 (West 2005); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 
(West Supp. 2006)). 
 72. Id. at 439 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 73. 5 U.S.C. § 1213 et seq. (2006). 
 74. Id. 
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The limited scope of the WPA’s protections poses a particular problem 
for government scientists who wish to expose scientific misconduct, such 
as reliance on “inferior data” or outright data suppression.75  Such miscon-
duct may indicate that a final agency action is unlawfully arbitrary in that it 
rests on selective consideration of the record before the agency;76 rarely, 
however, do scientific shenanigans provide sufficiently clear “evidence[]” 
of a legal violation, “gross mismanagement,” or “a substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety,”77 to qualify as protected disclosures un-
der the WPA.78 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s reading of the WPA’s 
“reasonabl[e] belie[f]” language79 worsens this underinclusivity and creates 
an onerous burden of proof for whistleblowers.  That court—which has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over whistleblower appeals under the WPA80—has re-
peatedly held that the Act requires that a whistleblower provide “irrefra-
gable proof” of wrongdoing to rebut the court’s presumption that “public 
officers perform their duties correctly, fairly, in good faith, and in accor-
dance with the law and governing regulations.”81  As a result, a government 
whistleblower risks retaliation unless her “reasonable belief” in the inculpa-
tory nature of the information she discloses amounts to an objectively veri-
fiable certainty.  In other words, under this standard, even active whistle-
blowers risk lawful retaliation for their actions unless they disclose not just 
a smoking gun, but one covered in their employer’s unmistakable finger-
prints. 
 
 75. Eugene Russo, The Plight of the Whistleblower, SCIENTIST, Jan. 17, 2005, at 39-40. 
 76. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (noting that agency action may be found arbitrary and capricious if “the agency has . 
. . offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency”). 
 77. § 1213. 
 78. See Russo, supra note 75, at 40; see also Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political 
Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1608-09, 1641 (2008) (“[W]histle-
blower protection for federal scientists is currently a thin reed.”).  The House version of a 
bill to strengthen protections for government whistleblowers, introduced in the last session 
of Congress, would have extended the WPA’s protections to whistleblowers who disclose 
“(1) any action that compromises the validity or accuracy of federally funded research or 
analysis; (2) the dissemination of false or misleading scientific . . . information;” and (3) any 
effort to restrict a government-funded scientist’s ability to publish or disseminate her results.  
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985, 110th Cong. (2007).  The 
Senate version of the bill included no such provision.  Federal Employee Protection of Dis-
closures Act, S. 274, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 79. § 1213. 
 80. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2006). 
 81. Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Alaska Airlines, 
Inc. v. Johnson, 8 F.3d 791, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
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The Federal Circuit also bears some responsibility for the WPA’s third 
major flaw, the absence of protections for some intra-agency disclosures.  
The court has interpreted the Act to exclude coverage “for disclosures 
made to [a government employee’s] immediate supervisor[].”82  On the 
positive side, this interpretation may foster some public rights litigation by 
encouraging government whistleblowers to disclose information to outside 
advocates.  Like Garcetti, however, the interpretation may also operate to 
discourage some government employees from opening their mouths at all, 
lest their external disclosure violate security laws or protocols, or subject 
them to public disapproval. 
Finally, the WPA’s fourth relevant flaw is its system for review of whis-
tleblower retaliation claims. Rather than allowing for a jury trial in federal 
district court, the Act requires federal employees to go through administra-
tive channels to file and pursue retaliation claims.83  Specifically, such em-
ployees must first file an appeal of an adverse agency employment action 
with an administrative law judge designated by the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board (“MSPB”).84  If the employee wishes to appeal the judge’s rul-
ing, she must file a petition for review with the MSPB itself.  Only if this 
second administrative appeal is unsuccessful may the employee appeal to 
an Article III court—and then only to the Federal Circuit.85  This system 
might be satisfactory if it functioned adequately to vindicate protections for 
whistleblowers, but the statistics speak for themselves: as of 2007, “not a 
single First Amendment . . . claim filed by a federal employee against their 
agency [had] ever been successful on the merits before” either the MSPB 
or the Federal Circuit.86 Further, even with respect to nonconstitutional 
claims, the Federal Circuit has utterly failed to offer an independent check 
on the MSPB appeals process, instead reviewing employees’ claims of re-
taliation “under a highly deferential standard of review which has histori-
cally led to an astronomical affirmance rate of 93%-96%.”87 
Whistleblowers dismayed by the WPA’s limitations have a few other 
weapons in their legal arsenal.  Almost thirty substantive statutes, including 
 
 82. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 441 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Willis v. 
Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Horton v. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 
279, 282 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1176 (1996)). 
 83. See generally WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 36, at 61-64 (describing the pro-
cedures mandated by the WPA and its predecessor, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See supra note 80. 
 86. Id. at 4. 
 87. Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees? 3 (Marquette 
Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies, Paper No. 08-10, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1010243. 
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the Clean Air Act,88 the Clean Water Act,89 and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act,90 provide protections to government whistleblowers who 
report statutory violations—including under-enforcement—by their em-
ployer agencies.91  But these subject-specific protections, too, have their 
limitations.  For one thing, the protections extend only to whistleblowers 
who disclose violations of the particular statute, resulting in piecemeal cov-
erage and making it difficult for a whistleblower—or a judge—to deter-
mine whether a particular disclosure merits protection.92  In addition, most 
of the statutes delegate enforcement authority to the Department of Labor 
(“DOL”) or, within DOL, to the Occupational Safety and Health Admini-
stration (“OSHA”).93  Given the number and complexity of whistleblower 
provisions that DOL and OSHA are charged with administering, it is per-
haps not surprising that their administrative review processes are time-
consuming.  The none-too-comfortingly titled Whistleblower’s Survival 
Guide warns potential informants that “[f]rom start to finish, the entire 
[OSHA] process frequently takes two or more years.”94  One can only 
imagine that some potential whistleblowers are deterred by the prospect of 
waiting multiple years for possible vindication of their disclosure rights. 
Finally, some of the subject-specific protections do not extend to federal 
whistleblowers.  In 2006, for example, the Bush Administration issued a 
legal opinion concluding that the Clean Water Act’s expansive whistle-
blower protection provision does not extend to federal employees who re-
port agency misconduct in connection with water pollution cleanup or en-
forcement, because—in the Administration’s view—the Act does not 
clearly and unequivocally waive the United States’ sovereign immunity 
from suit.95 
 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2006). 
 89. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). 
 90. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006). 
 91. See DEVINE, supra note 54, at 135 (indicating that as of 1997, the federal govern-
ment had passed twenty-eight whistleblower protection provisions); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, 
Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection:  A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 183, 208 n.134 (2007) (citing twenty-six statutes). 
 92. DEVINE, supra note 54, at 139 (describing the various whistleblower protection pro-
visions as creating “an inconsistent—and often irrational—system”); Ramirez, supra note 
91, at 211 (“Creating an omnibus [whistleblower protection] statute would eliminate requir-
ing expertise in discreet areas of law, and would permit [the agency charged with enforce-
ment of the protections] to concentrate its investigation and analysis on the issue of retalia-
tion.”). 
 93. Ramirez, supra note 91, at 208 & n.134. 
 94. DEVINE, supra note 54, at 137. 
 95. Letter from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Howard M. Radzely, Solicitor, Dep’t of Labor (Sept. 23, 2005), available at 
http://www.peer.org/docs/dol/06_31_8_ag_opinion.pdf. 
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If one accepts the conclusion that some amount of government whistle-
blowing is essential to some categories of public rights litigation, therefore, 
it should be clear that at least at the federal level, existing whistleblower 
protection laws do not adequately encourage such whistleblowing.  More-
over, it is worth noting that even comprehensive constitutional and statu-
tory whistleblower protections could not possibly deter all employer efforts 
at retaliation.  Thus, such protections promise little more than a right to a 
remedy if and when retaliation occurs.  But to benefit from that right, the 
whistleblower must have the wherewithal to risk the retaliation, and then to 
pursue a retaliation claim through whatever legal channels are available.  
The state of the protections available to federal whistleblowers thus rein-
forces the conclusion that it is an unusually resolute and tenacious federal 
employee who braves the risks of retaliation by coming forward to report 
her suspicions or knowledge of agency misconduct (determination and per-
sistence).96 
IV.  THE BEGINNINGS OF A MODEL 
From the discussion in Parts II and III, a model begins to emerge.  Liti-
gators seeking to achieve not just headlines, but systemic policy reform are 
likely to obtain the most useful, reliable, and comprehensive information 
from: (1) relatively senior government insiders with access to information, 
who (2) are not lawyers and are therefore unconstrained by client confiden-
tiality rules, (3) have no political or personal axe to grind, and (4) remain 
loyal to and in good standing at their agencies, but who (5) nevertheless 
choose to serve as insinuators, offering inside guidance to public rights ad-
vocates seeking to shape and implement a policy agenda, and (6) have 
strong personal or professional ties to those advocates.  The fact that these 
maximally useful whistleblowers are both loyal to their agencies and will-
ing to serve as low-level informants further suggests that one might expect 
them to be most active when they find themselves working for an admini-
stration with which they broadly disagree.  Finally, this last observation 
implies that the advocates receiving such whistleblowers’ guidance would 
be wise to implement a systematic procedure for evaluating the accuracy 
and completeness of whatever information they receive, so as to reduce the 
time spent pursuing leads that ultimately prove unproductive or biased. 
Very preliminary interviews with several public rights advocates sub-
stantiate this theoretical model, at least in part.  Active whistleblowers in-
deed fuel a relatively small percentage of the interviewees’ litigation activi-
 
 96. See generally Ramirez, supra note 91, at 187 (noting that anti-retaliation provisions 
hinge on a promise of a legal remedy “and thus, . . . operate to chill whistleblowing”). 
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ties.97 Certainly, when such whistleblowers are available, their information 
may serve as a key building block of a successful suit,98 but insinuators 
play a far more pervasive role.  In fact, one interviewee suggested that al-
most all of his litigation activity is informed in some way by seemingly 
offhand or passing remarks made to him in confidence by employees of the 
federal agency that he regularly sues.99  This information is indispensible to 
his litigation activities, but he must examine it carefully for inaccuracies 
and biases—a process that can be time-consuming unless the source’s in-
formation has proven consistently reliable in the past.  Moreover, any mis-
steps have dire consequences, not just for the advocate’s limited resources, 
but also for the public reputations of both his group and his cause. 
CONCLUSION 
Parts I and II of this Article offer a series of questions about government 
whistleblowers and whistleblowing, all of which have some bearing on the 
efficacy of public rights litigation.  The analytical model of whistleblowing 
developed in Parts II and III begins to address some of those questions, but 
the model requires significant empirical substantiation.  Moreover, even if 
the model proves accurate, it does not address many of the questions raised 
at the start of the Article, including (1) what types of information govern-
ment whistleblowers are most likely to overlook or decline to disclose; (2) 
how and to what degree political, personal, and cognitive biases taint whis-
tleblowers’ information; (3) how often public rights advocates are misled—
deliberately or otherwise—by biased or otherwise inaccurate information; 
and (4) what measures such advocates can and do take to encourage useful 
and accurate disclosures,100 and to guard against untrue, biased, incom-
plete, or otherwise misleading disclosures. 
These questions cannot be answered without conducting a survey of 
agency employees, public rights litigators, and attorneys who have repre-
sented whistleblowers in retaliation claims.  Such a survey should explore 
the scope of government whistleblowing activities, the incentives driving 
 
 97. Interviews with anonymous sources, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 12-13, 2008, Jan. 16., 
2009). 
 98. For an example of one case built largely on whistleblower disclosures, see Pac. 
Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 
2005) (finding aspects of the Klamath Irrigation Project operating plan arbitrary and capri-
cious, thanks in part to information supplied by National Marine Fisheries Service whistle-
blower Michael Kelly). 
 99. Interviews with anonymous sources, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 12-13, 2008). 
 100. For example, perhaps public rights advocates should prioritize hiring former agency 
insiders, not just for the information they can provide immediately, but also for their con-
nections to friends and colleagues who remain at the agency. 
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government whistleblowers, the degree to which current legal and ethical 
regimes—and practical constraints—affect those incentives, and public 
rights litigators’ efforts (if any) to encourage useful disclosures.  The re-
sults would provide insights about the state of public rights litigation and, 
consequently, about the adequacy of judicial review as a check on execu-
tive branch overreaching.101 
 
 101. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2349-51 
(2001).  Kagan notes that the more control the President exercises in a given administration, 
the more likely agencies may be “to deviate from accepted interpretations of [congressional] 
delegation provisions”—that is, to act unlawfully.  Id. at 2349.  She argues, however, that 
judicial review adequately responds to this threat:  “so long as the courts remain open to le-
gal challenges, the use of presidential directive authority cannot too greatly displace the 
clear preferences of the prior enacting . . . Congress with respect to agency action.”  Id. at 
2351. 
